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EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN ANTITRUST
ELYSE DORSEY† & JONATHAN M. JACOBSON††
INTRODUCTION
American society has a long history of encouraging
competition and a long history of abhorring monopoly. Often
those two goals are complementary, but not always. What
happens if a company competes so aggressively that it wipes out
its competitors and gets a monopoly? Is that good or bad? The
easy answer is that normal competition is fine, but unfair or
predatory competition is not. But that easy answer is not
particularly helpful. It is often very hard to distinguish the good
from the bad. Low prices are good, right? But what if they are
below cost so that rivals cannot compete?
Courts and commentators have struggled hard for many
decades to develop rules that separate the lawful conduct of a
single firm from the unlawful. That struggle continues today.
We trace a bit of the history of this struggle, summarize where
the courts are today, and then offer a few suggestions for a path
going forward.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

While “exclusionary” or “predatory” conduct lies at the heart
of antitrust law’s single firm proscription,1 the precise definitions
of these terms have evaded and intrigued courts and scholars
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1
The governing statute, section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012),
provides in part: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” The statute has not been used criminally for decades.
††
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and have been the source of much consternation for decades.2
Courts have repeatedly recognized that “[w]hether any particular
act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than merely a form of
vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern: the means of
illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are
myriad.”3 Analyzing the derivations of the exclusionary conduct
concept and its tumultuous development over the past 120 years
is, therefore, useful to understanding how antitrust law regards
single-firm conduct today—and especially to attempting to
separate the conduct we encourage from the behavior we
condemn.
We begin at the beginning. Congress passed the Sherman
Act in 1890 in response to a rash of corporate consolidations and
a growing perception that the “trusts” being created threatened
to impair the free market economy and to impose upon the
country a system comprised solely of behemoth businesses
well-poised to exploit the population at large.4 The expansion of
these “great trusts” had accelerated in the dozen or so years
leading up to 1890—with well-despised trusts such as Standard
Oil5 and American Tobacco,6 as well as the Beef,7 Sugar,8 and
Gunpowder9 trusts, seeming to proliferate. These and other
2
See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.
1975) (noting the term “predatory” “probably does not have a well-defined meaning
in the context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister connotation”).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“ ‘Anticompetitive conduct’ can come in too many different forms,
and is too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have
enumerated all the varieties.”).
4
See, e.g., EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD 2000-1887, at 127 (John L.
Thomas ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (predicting the tendency toward trusts
would persist until society would be transformed into one great trust); Sanford D.
Gordon, Attitudes Towards Trusts Prior to the Sherman Act, 30 S. ECON. J. 156, 159
(1963) (detailing the growing concern across various sectors of the country with the
problem of the great trusts and noting that thirteen states passed antitrust
legislation before Congress passed the Sherman Act, but that when the states
enforced their antitrust laws, the trusts would merely “incorporate[] in other states
and continue[] their activities as they had done before the court’s decisions”); Robert
H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82–83 (1982).
5
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
6
See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
7
See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
8
See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9
See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 188 F. 127 (C.C.D.
Del. 1911).
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trusts monopolized their industries, raised prices, and excluded
competitors.10 And their abuses, both realized and potential,
created a political firestorm.11
Enter the Sherman Act.
A relatively simple
statute—especially compared to many of its modern
counterparts—the Sherman Act was intended, in part, to codify
common law at the federal level.12 It was comprised of two main
sections. Section 1 was directed at combinations or conspiracies
among two or more actors.13 Section 2—which was not a
codification of common law principles—was directed at efforts to
monopolize by a single firm or firms, that is, unilateral conduct.14
Despite its apparent simplicity, the Sherman Act had the
capacity to encompass a multitude of anticompetitive sins.15
While it was utilized in its first several decades to address
the problem of the original great trusts, the Act’s development
outside this narrow arena—that is, where large corporate
consolidations yielded firms of monopoly size that engaged in
abusive conduct16—occurred more slowly.17 Its broad language
left open for development the concept of “monopolization” and its
myriad manifestations and abuses, but the many gaps were not
immediately filled.18 For the first sixty years following its

10

See, e.g., id. at 151–52.
See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 163 (1954); see also
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (“[M]onopoly power, whether
lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned
under s 2 even though it remains unexercised.”).
12
E.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997); United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U.S.
1 (1945).
13
Sherman Antitrust Act ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
14
Ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
15
See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) (“[T]he generic
designation of the 1st and 2d sections of the law, when taken together, embraced
every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the
prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were
clothed.”).
16
Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (1956); see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 356–58 (1904) (holding by a 5-4 majority that the Sherman Act applies to stock
acquisitions).
17
Director & Levi, supra note 16, at 282.
18
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury:
Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273,
274–75 (1998).
11
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passage, for example, there was some, but very little, private
enforcement.19 The Act as originally enacted contained the now
well-known treble damages remedy for private enforcement,20 but
only 157 treble damages actions were recorded between 1899 and
1939, with only fourteen plaintiffs recovering less than $275,000
total.21
Indeed, the first truly significant single-firm conduct
case—the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) case against
Alcoa—was not initiated until 1938, almost fifty years after the
Act was passed.22 This case yielded one of the most significant
precedents within antitrust law: an opinion by Judge Learned
Hand in 1945 for the Second Circuit.23 That court was sitting as
the court of last resort by special act of Congress because the
Supreme Court lacked a quorum.24 The court famously held that
a firm that intentionally acquires monopoly power violates
section 2.25 Following decades of dominance, the DOJ had
accused Alcoa of monopolizing the aluminum ingot market, and
the court concluded Alcoa’s control of this market exceeded
ninety percent.26 After rendering this conclusion, the court
turned to evaluating whether Alcoa violated the Sherman Act.27
The court noted that, merely because Alcoa had achieved such
monopoly power, it did not necessarily violate section 2,
recognizing that “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged
to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”28
Nonetheless, given the touchstone of intent, the court quickly
concluded Alcoa had unlawfully monopolized the aluminum ingot
market principally by expanding its production capacity such
that consumers did not need to turn to Alcoa’s competitors for
supply.29 Thus, the court ultimately held that unless monopoly
19

Id. at 275.
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (repealed 1914).
21
Jacobson & Greer, supra note 18, at 275 & n.16.
22
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945)
[hereinafter Alcoa].
23
Id.
24
Act of June 9, 1944, ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272, amended by Act of Dec. 21, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93–528, 88 Stat. 1706.
25
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431–32.
26
Id. at 425.
27
Id. at 426–32.
28
Id. at 429–30.
29
Id. at 431 (“It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always anticipate
increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing
20
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was “thrust upon” Alcoa or “merely [the result] of . . . skill,
foresight and industry,” the act of monopolization was intentional
and therefore unlawful.30
The court’s conception of monopolization in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America31 (“Alcoa”) became the leading
standard, reigning supreme from its first articulation through
the 1970s. It was adopted and reiterated by the courts, and was
largely codified in the Court’s 1966 decision in United States v.
Grinnell Corp.32 In that case, the Supreme Court articulated the
monopolization formula still used today, holding that unlawful
monopolization is “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”33 The effect of applying the Alcoa rule under this
articulation was that, once monopoly power was proven, it was
difficult for any defendant to avoid condemnation under section
2.
This rule and its effect were informed by developments
occurring in the area of price discrimination under the Clayton
Act and the 1936 amendments known as the Robinson-Patman
Act.34 The pervading sense in this early era was that selective
price cutting that damaged rivals was harmful in and of itself.35
This sense largely derived from the understanding that it was
unfair for large buyers to receive discounts simply because they
were large, and that small businesses should be protected
against such unwarranted disparity of treatment.36 As such, the
compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the
field. It insists that it never excluded competitors, but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened,
and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great
organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of
personnel.”).
30
Id. at 430.
31
See generally id.
32
384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
33
Id. The phrasing drew from the government’s brief. See Brief for the United
States at 41, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (“[T]he willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power, i.e., that such power was not ‘thrust upon’
its possessor.”) (citation omitted).
34
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012).
35
See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934).
36
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948) (“The
legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that
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Clayton Act was passed in 1914, “born of a desire by Congress to
curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized
price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive
position of other sellers.”37
Finding this Act, alone,
unsatisfactory, Congress soon after supplemented it with the
Robinson-Patman Act, which “was aimed at a specific weapon of
the monopolist—predatory pricing.”38 The Robinson-Patman Act
attacked predatory pricing by prohibiting price discrimination
“between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality”;39 this prohibition meant a supplier was foreclosed both
from charging lower prices in certain geographic areas while
leaving prices intact in other areas, so as to leverage its market
power and drive competitors out of business, and from offering
buyers volume discounts, among other things.40
Reflecting the animosity toward price discrimination
characteristic of the time, courts applying the Robinson-Patman
Act quickly made clear that—unlike today—civil predatory
pricing claims under the Robinson-Patman Act did not require a
demonstration that the defendant’s prices were below cost.41
Rather, the courts consistently held that many varieties of price
cutting to one or more, but not all, buyers were unlawful. The
Supreme Court in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,42 for instance,
noted that the Court had consistently defined “price
discrimination” for Robinson-Patman purposes as “merely a price
difference.”43 As many have noted since, this definition denied
Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive
advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing
ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer of such
advantages . . . .”).
37
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 (1960).
38
United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1963).
39
15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
40
Id.
41
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. at 547–48; Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co.,
348 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1954); Cont’l Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476
F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir. 1973); Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n , 412
F.2d 605, 616 (7th Cir. 1969). Criminal Robinson-Patman claims did require a
demonstration of below-cost pricing. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 33–34
(1963).
42
363 U.S. 536.
43
Id. at 549 (“When this Court has spoken of price discrimination in s 2(a)
cases, it has generally assumed that the term was synonymous with price
differentiation.”); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45
(1948) (identifying the “avowed purpose” of the Robinson-Patman Amendment as
“protect[ing] competition from all price differentials except those based in full on cost
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large buyers the benefits of economies of scale and otherwise
eliminated the beneficial effects that price discrimination could
offer.44 Given this emblematic backdrop, many cases seemingly
illogical to us today were fairly commonplace throughout this
period.45
Indeed, much of the conduct that is universally recognized as
enhancing consumer welfare today was condemned as unlawful
monopolization in the Alcoa era. In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co.,46 for example, the Court analyzed claims that the
defendants violated the antitrust laws by lowering their prices on
frozen pies in order to entice distributor grocery stores into
buying their pies rather than their competitors’ and creating
what the Court called a “declining price structure.”47 The court
concluded these allegations, along with evidence that distributors
did, in fact, buy more of the defendants’ pies, were sufficient to
support an antitrust violation.48 In holding that “a competitor
who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time low in a
market of declining prices will in time feel the financial pinch
and will be a less effective competitive force,” the Court
essentially entirely discounted the consumer welfare benefits
attendant to the lower prices and increased output deriving from
this price competition.49 Today, it is unfathomable that a

savings” to the supplier, and holding “Congress meant by using the words
‘discrimination in price’ in s 2 that in a case involving competitive injury between a
seller’s customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one
purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the
purchaser’s competitors”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 721
(1948) (defining “discrimination in price” as “selling the same kind of goods cheaper
to one purchaser than to another”); Moss v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 148 F.2d 378, 379
(2d Cir. 1945) (holding that proof of a price differential itself constituted
“discrimination in price,” where the competitive injury in question was between
sellers).
44
See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se
Illegality, the Rule of Reason and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1012–13
(2014).
45
Scholars have documented the significant shift in application of the RobinsonPatman Act since its first enactment. See, e.g., Ryan Luchs et al., The End of the
Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data, 56 MGMT. SCI. 2123 (2010);
D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson Patman, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015).
46
386 U.S. 685 (1967).
47
Id. at 689–91, 703.
48
Id. at 699–700 (decided under the Robinson-Patman Act, applying Sherman
Act principles).
49
Id.
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competitor could successfully bring such a case; modern courts
are, rightfully, quite skeptical of antitrust allegations in which
the alleged anticompetitive conduct is the defendant’s price
decreases. Price competition is the paradigmatic consumer
benefit of competitive markets and only in the rarest of instances
entails a real potential for anticompetitive harms. But, in the
late 1960s, this line of analysis had yet to be adopted by the
courts.50
II. INFLUENCE OF CHICAGO ECONOMICS
Largely owing to cases like Utah Pie, antitrust law became a
focal point for many law and economics scholars from the 1950s
forward. These scholars analyzed the current state of the law
and, in many cases, found antitrust to be a meandering and
incoherent jumble.51 Their findings led to serious academic
challenges to the Alcoa-Grinnell paradigm and to a strong push
to incorporate microeconomic principles into antitrust analysis.52
What is known as the “Chicago School” was at the forefront of
these challenges.53
Rigorous debates, led by prominent scholars at the
University of Chicago and spearheaded by Aaron Director, called
into question the very foundations of antitrust law as it had been
adopted and implemented by the courts.54 These scholars derided
antitrust’s internal inconsistencies, and proffered that tethering
50

See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1963).
See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Law and Economic Theory: Finding
a Balance, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 125–29 (2013).
52
For an excellent history and analysis of the integration of economics into
antitrust law, see id. at 130–48.
53
Id. at 140–41.
54
See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES,
ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS xvi (2d ed. 1981) (“Much of the economic
analysis expounded in these notes is based on ideas first proposed by Director. A
number of these ideas were later developed and published by other economists
whose work we cite, but these citations conceal Director’s seminal role in the
development of the economics of competition and monopoly presented in this book.”);
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time
To Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 150 (2012) (“The historical
accounts of the Chicago School of Antitrust uniformly agree on the central influence
of Aaron Director and the Antitrust Law course he taught with Edward Levi at the
University of Chicago.”); William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of
Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1221, 1229–30 (1989). See generally Director & Levi, supra note 16; Sam
Peltzman, Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust Policy, 48 J.L. & ECON. 313
(2005).
51
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antitrust law to economic analysis would bring the order and
consistency for which they believed antitrust was so desperate.
Director and Levi, for example, criticized the inherent tension in
Alcoa—which espoused the importance of not turning upon the
successful competitor but went on to do just that—noting rather
tongue-in-cheekily that “[p]erhaps . . . the successful competitor
can be turned upon when he wins, because he has been told not
to compete.”55
Director’s and others’ critiques, in turn, sparked the famous
“Fortune Magazine Debates,” a series of papers with Robert H.
Bork and Ward S. Bowman, Jr. on one side, arguing that the
time had come for an antitrust reckoning, and Harlan H. Blake
and William K. Jones on the other, defending antitrust law
largely as it was.56 Following Director and Levi, Bork and
Bowman contended there existed “a fundamental and widespread
misconception of the nature and virtues of the competitive
process,” and argued that the true value of competition lay in its
ability to “provide[] society with the maximum output that can be
achieved at any given time with the resources at its command.”57
Blake and Jones, meanwhile, argued competition should be
protected for reasons other than economic efficiency; political
objectives, such as protecting individual freedom and
opportunity, were, in their view, worthy antitrust goals.58
Ultimately, many of Bork and Bowman’s positions were
embraced by antitrust law more broadly. Bork expanded upon
the issues in his seminal book, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at
55
Director & Levi, supra note 16, at 286. Director did not publish his antitrust
analysis. This Law and the Future paper, written largely by Levi, is his only
significant published work. His influence instead was carried orally, first by himself,
and later by his many followers, most prominently Robert Bork.
56
See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 377 (1965); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a ThreeDimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965); Robert H. Bork & Ward
S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Robert H.
Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965); Ward S.
Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: II, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (1965).
57
Bork & Bowman, supra note 56, at 364–65. Competition, they proffered, could
conceivably be injured when either (1) consenting parties purposefully eliminate
competition by, for example, agreement, acquisition, or merger, or (2) competitors
compete too successfully and injure their rivals. Only the first scenario should be
protected by antitrust laws, because doing so promotes the efficient allocation of
resources, while the second protects less efficient competitors, keeping prices high
and output low. See Bork, supra note 56, at 401–02.
58
Blake & Jones, supra note 56, at 427–36.
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War with Itself.59 Here, Bork more fully explicated his argument
that antitrust law, as developed by the courts, suffered from fatal
internal conflicts—or, more colorfully, from schizophrenia.60
Rather than considering the protection of competitors—which led
to odd scenarios such as Utah Pie where the courts condemned
conduct that benefited consumers but harmed certain
competitors—Bork argued antitrust should seek to protect
consumers.61 He proffered that the Sherman Act was designed as
a “consumer welfare prescription,” and that, both as policy and
economic matters, focusing upon consumer welfare was the
solution for resolving antitrust’s inconsistencies.62
He
underscored the point by observing that having multiple diffuse
While protecting
goals makes antitrust unworkable.63
competitors meant keeping prices high and output low, the
precise conditions occurring in monopolistic, anticompetitive
markets, protecting consumers also promoted price decreases,
output increases, and enhancements in services and product
quality.
The argument that antitrust should protect consumers—that
is, that it should encourage lower prices, higher production,
better quality, faster innovation, and so forth—was the key
contribution of the Chicago School.64 The Chicago School rejected
the idea that protecting competitors was an acceptable purpose of
antitrust law.65 If competitors lost opportunities because they
were less efficient, that was a good thing, not a bad one.
The Chicago School’s world view was informed
predominantly by (1) economic teachings and (2) the error cost
framework.66
Chicagoans believed antitrust law should be
informed by, and respond to, what economic theory and empirical

59

See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
(1993).
60
Bork & Bowman, supra note 56, at 364.
61
BORK, supra note 59, at 66.
62
Id. Bork’s concept of “consumer welfare,” a new phrase at the time, was a
shorthand for “the total welfare of all consumers as a class.” Id. at 110. That concept
should be distinguished from “consumer welfare” in the economic sense of “consumer
surplus.” See Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition
Matters, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 718–26 (2014).
63
BORK, supra note 59, at 50.
64
Id. at xi.
65
Id. at 50–51.
66
Page, supra note 54, at 1240–41.
WITH ITSELF
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evidence suggested regarding particular conduct.67 Economic
theory could illuminate the circumstances under which certain
behaviors were likely to yield anticompetitive effects, while
empirical evidence could demonstrate how often, in fact, such
circumstances occurred and whether they did or did not dampen
competition.68
The error cost framework, meanwhile, posited that Type I,
false positive, errors in antitrust enforcement—which
erroneously condemn procompetitive behavior—would be far
more costly than Type II, false negative, errors, or those that fail
to punish anticompetitive behavior.69 Erroneous imposition of
antitrust liability, it was argued, not only eliminates competitive
actions of the firm facing liability, thereby reducing the level of
competition within that industry, but further has a reverberating
effect across the economy.70 The chilling effects of erroneous
condemnation may be quite severe: Because antitrust trebles
damages, similarly situated firms are sure to stay far afield of
any procompetitive behaviors resembling those previously
condemned, meaning that levels of competition outside of the
industry at issue may also diminish in response.71 Type II errors,
on the other hand, allow anticompetitive actions to persist.
Chicagoans argued—based on theory rather than empirics—that
these errors raise fewer concerns as such anticompetitive
behavior can yield above average returns, thereby attracting new
entry and more competition.72 In other words, they argued, we
can expect the industry to experience some degree of
self-correction over time.73 Combined, the error cost framework
and reliance upon economics yielded a prescription for antitrust
law that was far more hands-off than antitrust had historically
been.
The Chicago School’s suggestions were largely, but not
entirely, successful. Its notions that antitrust should take its
cues from economic teachings and strive to preserve competition,
not competitors, rapidly ascended, promoted by prominent
67

BORK, supra note 59, at 430.
Page, supra note 54, at 1242.
69
Id. at 1243.
70
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16
(1984).
71
Id. at 34.
72
Id. at 15.
73
Id.
68
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Chicagoans like Lester Telser,74 John McGee,75 and, later,
Richard Posner76 and Frank Easterbrook.77 As developed below,
the courts endorsed and adopted a number of these views and
continue to rely upon many of these insights today.
More controversial was orthodox Chicagoans’ proposal for a
total welfare approach to antitrust. Although they used the term
“consumer welfare,” these scholars actually endorsed an
approach under which a wealth transfer from consumers to
producers, alone, should not be actionable.78 For these orthodox
Chicagoans, efficiency was the only proper goal of antitrust law;
the evil of monopolization was considered to be the so-called
“deadweight loss” that arises when firms with monopoly power
restrict output and increase prices.79 Enforcement, under this
view, was to be limited to those contexts in which the conduct
yielded a deadweight welfare loss.80 If, for example, certain
behavior merely transferred benefits from consumers to
producers, thereby resulting in a producer surplus but no
deadweight loss to society, this result was efficient to the market
overall and should be recognized as such.81
This paradigm was intended to be, and was, a recipe for
laissez-faire.
While the degree to which Chicago scholars
embraced the laissez-faire approach varied, many advocated for a
strong hands-off policy towards exclusionary conduct—apart
from cartels and mergers to monopoly.82 These scholars proffered
the laissez-faire approach should succeed even in cases where a
74
See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3.
J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
75
See, e.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.)
Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137, 137–38 (1958).
76
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
77
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984).
78
BORK, supra note 59, at 66, 97; see, e.g., Ken Heyer, Robert Bork and Welfare
Standards, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2015); Lande, supra note 4, at 75; Sokol,
supra note 44, at 1007–08.
79
BORK, supra note 59, at 101.
80
See id.
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 54, at 154 (“The early Chicago
School analyses did produce nearly uniform results in rejecting the existing, noneconomic-based antitrust doctrine of the 1960s. But agreement on what not to do
does not mean agreement on what to do.”); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning
Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 241, 244–45 (2012) (noting the “heterogeneity in both economic approaches and
policy prescriptions” within the Chicago school).
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deadweight loss was a real prospect, proposing such rules as
banning competitor lawsuits83 and per se legality for vertical
To these scholars, the risks attendant to
restraints.84
misdiagnosing and condemning anticompetitive conduct
outweighed the potential benefits of correctly capturing truly
anticompetitive conduct, which was perceived to occur
comparatively infrequently.
The Chicago School’s general adoption of the laissez-faire
approach is often contrasted to the “Harvard” School’s approach,
which developed at the same time. Scholars within the Harvard
School largely agreed with the call for antitrust to employ an
economic approach but did not at all agree with the ultimate
laissez-faire prescription.85 Impactful scholars such as Phillip
Areeda, Donald F. Turner, and Herbert Hovenkamp86 recognized
the troubles plaguing antitrust, but proffered an approach
allowing for a more hands-on response to potential competition
issues.
Like the orthodox Chicago scholars, their work
contributed significantly to antitrust law’s overhaul. Areeda and
Turner’s article on predatory pricing under section 2, for
instance, is one of the most influential pieces in the history of
American law.87 The combination of efforts from the Chicago and
Harvard schools pushing for an antitrust regime tied to economic

83

Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 34–37.
BORK, supra note 59, at 288 (“[E]very vertical restraint should be completely
lawful.”); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9, 23–26 (1981).
85
For example, Areeda and Turner likewise noted the dangers of allowing
competitor suits, specifically in the context of predatory pricing claims. See Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975) (arguing that in framing antitrust
rules for predatory pricing “extreme care be taken . . . lest the threat of litigation,
particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing”).
86
While Herbert Hovenkamp is largely associated with the Harvard School, in
some of his writings he appears to take a more Chicagoan tact. See, e.g., HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005).
87
Areeda & Turner, supra note 85, at 698 (articulating the now well-understood
notion that “predatory pricing would make little economic sense to a potential
predator unless he had (1) greater financial staying power than his rivals, and (2) a
very substantial prospect that the losses he incurs in the predatory campaign will be
exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed”).
84
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analysis—which both aligned with economic theory and reacted
to empirical evidence—brought meaningful and lasting change to
antitrust.88
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Over the course of the period from the mid 1970s to the
present, the law applicable to dominant firm conduct changed
almost completely in a manner perhaps unsurpassed in legal
history. Many types of conduct that were almost certainly illegal
in 1975 were almost certainly legal in 2010 and remain so
today.89 Antitrust courts’ reaction to the laissez-faire total
welfare approach varied, but they readily adopted an economic
approach, applying theory and empirical evidence in a factintensive analysis of the cases at hand.
For analysis of exclusionary conduct under section 2, this
transformation began in 1975 in the Tenth Circuit case, Telex
Corp. v. IBM.90 In that case, Telex accused IBM of engaging in
predatory conduct by, among other things, examining its
competitors’ pricing and strategies, and adjusting its own pricing
and strategies accordingly.91 Analyzing these allegations and
applying its understanding of antitrust law and economics, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that Alcoa’s “thrust upon”
language meant a monopolist’s allegedly predatory conduct must
be “entirely involuntary.”92 The court recognized that this
conception would entrench a firm in a state of stasis once it
acquired monopoly power, essentially prohibiting the firm from
further competing—and that such stasis is, itself, antithetical to
antitrust’s goals of enhancing the competitive process.93

88
For a critical view, see Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the
Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511,
1513, 1569–70 (1984).
89
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S.
Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix,
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–5.
90
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). Arguably, the first signs of an antitrust shift
came in a merger case, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., decided the year
before. 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974). But Telex was the first case to seriously revisit the
concept of exclusionary conduct under section 2.
91
Telex, 510 F.2d at 900–02.
92
Id. at 927.
93
Id. at 927–28.
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The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals subsequently,
and similarly, began applying the Chicago and Harvard
approaches and, accordingly, narrowing antitrust law’s scope in
other areas, including with respect to competitor suits94 and
vertical distribution restrictions.95 In recrafting the antitrust
rules, the courts were heavily influenced by the economic
approach to antitrust generally and to section 2 particularly. In
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,96 for example, the
Second Circuit explained the “rightful” meaning of Alcoa’s
statement that section 2 prohibits even well-behaved monopolies
was that “if monopoly power has been acquired or maintained
through improper means, the fact that the power has not been
used to extract improper benefits provides no succor to the
monopolist.”97 Indeed, as scholars had urged was necessary, the
Berkey Court distinguished between a firm’s procompetitively
exercising the benefits of its size, such as by taking advantage of
scale economies, and its abusing its size to the detriment of
consumers, by, for instance, engaging in actions that “are
possible or effective only if taken by a firm that dominates its
smaller rivals.”98
Similarly, in California Computer Products v. IBM,99 the
Ninth Circuit recognized that, “[w]here the opportunity exists to
increase or protect market share profitably by offering equivalent
or superior performance at a lower price, even a virtual
monopolist may do so.”100 These cases essentially eschewed the
aspects of Alcoa that would condemn the successful competitor
for having succeeded. In doing so, they began to recognize that

94

See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(holding an antitrust competitor plaintiff “must prove antitrust injury, which is to
say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful” (emphasis added)).
95
See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56–59 (1977);
Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283, 287–88 (1975) (holding a manufacturer’s imposition of
exclusive geographic distribution restrictions upon its retailers was not per se
unlawful, but should be evaluated under the rule of reason).
96
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
97
Id. at 274.
98
Id. at 274–75.
99
613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
100
Id. at 742.
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protecting competition is not an end unto itself, but merely a
means for preserving and enhancing consumer welfare and the
competitive process.
Continuing in this vein, the courts largely adopted variants
of Areeda and Turner’s approach to predatory pricing. The
courts acknowledged an especially stringent test should apply in
cases where the proffered anticompetitive conduct related to
price reductions, in order to avoid chilling price competition.101
The Supreme Court in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.,102 for instance, explained that predatory
pricing schemes are unlikely to be attempted due to their high
likelihood of failure.
The alleged predator must: (1) forgo
immediately available profits; (2) successfully drive competitors
out; and (3) successfully keep competitors out long enough to
recoup its losses.103 In other words, predatory pricing requires a
predator to engage in a risky, unprofitable course of action, with
the hope of not only attaining but also of maintaining monopoly
power at some later date when it is charging supracompetitive
prices—often no mean feat, given such high prices inevitably
entice competitors to enter the market and share in the profits.
Moreover, as the Court noted, “cutting prices in order to increase
business often is the very essence of competition. Thus, mistaken
inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
protect.”104 The Supreme Court reiterated this sentiment in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,105
remarking that it “would be ironic indeed if the standards for
predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits
themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.”106
While embracing many of the Chicago School’s proffered
approaches, the courts nonetheless rejected some of the more
extreme Chicago positions. For instance, the Supreme Court

101
While there is relative consensus today that an antitrust defendant’s prices
must be below some measure of cost before a section 2 violation can arise, there
remains significant dispute as to how to measure costs and the circumstances under
which predatory pricing may—or has—occurred. See generally Symposium, 100
Years of Standard Oil Antitrust, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429 (2012).
102
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
103
Id. at 588–91.
104
Id. at 594.
105
509 U.S. 209 (1993).
106
Id. at 226–27.
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declined to adopt a per se rule denying competitor-plaintiffs
standing to challenge acquisitions on the basis of predatory
pricing theories—which many Chicagoans supported—reasoning
that it “would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing to a
party seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely
because such injuries rarely occur.”107 Similarly, the Court
refused to hold vertical restraints to be per se lawful, though it
did generally acknowledge such arrangements are often
associated with procompetitive efficiencies.108
IV. POST-CHICAGO
The general laissez-faire approach of the Chicago School
prevailed in some arenas for a number of years, but by the early
1990s, it started to become supplanted, at least in academia, by
what has been called the “Post-Chicago” approach. For section 2
purposes, one key insight of this approach was the concept of
“raising rivals’ costs”109 (“RRC”). This concept focuses upon a

107

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121–22 (1986).
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–63
(1984) (holding vertical agreements between manufacturers and distributors may
violate the antitrust laws, but recognizing manufacturers and distributors have
many “legitimate reasons” for coordinating along various dimensions, such as the
manufacturer’s desire to ensure that outside competitors are not “free-riding” off the
investments its distributors are making into marketing, hiring, and training
knowledgeable employees, and so forth).
109
See Thomas Krattenmaker & Stephen C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986);
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON.
19, 19–20 (1987); Stephen C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267 (1983) [hereinafter Raising Rivals’ Costs]. While the raising
rivals’ costs framework is generally considered the “quintessential example of the
difference between Chicago School and Post-Chicago School antitrust economics,”
many scholars have argued that the Chicago school in fact anticipated and
accounted for these strategies. Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 54, at 161; see, e.g.,
Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where
Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW CHICAGO OVERSHOT THE MARK 141, 145
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (“[I]t is important to recognize that [Post-Chicago RRC
theory] has its roots in the economic analysis of Chicago School commentators.”);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 158–
59 (2005) (describing raising rivals’ costs as one of the “foundations of the so-called
post-Chicago revolution”). But see Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 54, at 159, 161
(suggesting “the contributions of the Post-Chicago school to antitrust doctrine and
policy are limited,” and arguing the Chicago school “did not ignore RRC”); Joshua D.
Wright, Moving Beyond Naive Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163,
1163 n.3 (2012) (“The roots of the modern RRC theory were anticipated by Aaron
Director and Edward H. Levi.”).
108
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competitor’s ability to diminish competition, not by offering a
better product in any sense of the word, but by increasing
operating expenses for its rivals.110 Early advocates of this
framework focused upon two legitimate theories of RRC:
(1) foreclosing supply, and (2) inducing collusion.111 The first
theory relates to a predator’s acquisition of an exclusionary
right—such as an exclusive dealing contract—over a portion of
supply such that competitors are foreclosed from achieving
minimum efficient scale—that is, the scale necessary to remain
The second acknowledges that
competitively effective.112
exclusionary vertical restraints may, under certain conditions,
facilitate pricing coordination that benefits the colluding
suppliers while raising costs to the purchaser’s non-colluding
competitors.113 Under RRC theory, the dominant firm need
neither to set unprofitable prices for itself in the first time period
nor to recoup these losses in any subsequent period.114 Thus,
from the outset, the RRC framework posits a view of exclusionary
conduct that is both profitable for the dominant firm and harmful
to consumers.115 It also considers that such conduct may occur
along numerous, non-price dimensions, such as by foreclosing
rivals from access to inputs or customers.116
The insight underlying the RRC approach was that, if
conduct by a dominant firm impaired rivals’ abilities to compete
to such an extent that the rivals could no longer constrain the
defendant’s market power, that lack of constraint constituted a
potentially serious problem.117 The result would be increased
prices to consumers, diminished innovation, lower quality, fewer
services, and so forth.118 Post-Chicago analysis, similar to
Chicago analysis, thus recognizes the value of competitors—but
only to the extent that the competitors protect consumers.
110

Salop & Scheffman, supra note 109.
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 236–42.
112
Id. at 236–38.
113
Id. at 238.
114
Raising Rivals’ Costs, supra note 109, at 267.
115
Id. at 268, 270.
116
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 224.
117
Id.
118
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg2010.html; see also Daniel Rockower, Antitrust Implications of the Comcast-Time
Warner Cable Merger, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Apr. 11, 2014, 4:04 PM), available at
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/13011.
111
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Today, the general consensus seems to be that the RRC
framework is more useful for evaluating most forms of
exclusionary conduct than the predation framework.119
The courts have likewise recognized the value of viewing
cases through the post-Chicago lens. In 1992, the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of information costs in upholding a
plaintiff’s unlawful tying claim in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.120 Since then, economic foreclosure, as
developed by post-Chicago analysts, has become a focal point in
many cases. For instance, in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,121
the D.C. Circuit evaluated allegations that Microsoft’s exclusive
dealing contracts with computer manufacturers and Internet
access providers (“IAPs”) foreclosed competitor web browsers
from efficient access to consumers.122 Under these exclusive
contracts, computer manufacturers were not permitted to remove
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer icon from their computers’
desktops, and IAPs, such as AOL, were not permitted to promote
non-Microsoft browsers or to supply more than fifteen percent of
their subscribers with such browsers.123 Because computer
manufacturers and IAPs were the most cost-effective channels by
which browsers could reach consumers, and because Microsoft
had such exclusive contracts with fourteen of the fifteen largest
IAPs, the court held Microsoft had unlawfully exploited its
monopoly power to foreclose its rivals and to prevent them from
challenging its monopolistic advantage.124

119
See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 261, 288 n.147, 339 n.418 (2010) (citing cases criticizing predation issues);
Wright, supra note 109, at 1163. The major exceptions are predatory pricing and
refusals to deal. See also infra text accompanying notes 195, 200.
120
504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992).
121
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
122
Id. at 45.
123
Id. at 60–61, 68.
124
Id. at 64 (“[W]e hold that . . . all the OEM license restrictions at issue
represent uses of Microsoft’s market power to protect its monopoly . . . .”); id. at 71
(“By ensuring that the ‘majority’ of all IAP subscribers are offered [Internet
Explorer] either as the default browser or as the only browser, Microsoft’s deals with
the IAPs clearly have a significant effect in preserving its monopoly; they help keep
usage of Navigator below the critical level necessary for Navigator or any other rival
to pose a real threat to Microsoft’s monopoly.”).
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WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

While much of the fall-out from the antitrust overhaul
beginning in the 1970s has settled, and antitrust today is
comparatively more stable, several significant questions remain
regarding how antitrust courts, scholars, and lawyers can and
should analyze various allegedly anticompetitive conducts. Many
of these concerns have become especially pronounced as the
economy shifts to rely increasingly upon high-technology
industries, whose markets and behaviors are dynamic and often
novel. The desire for antitrust to provide clearer rules and
guidelines grows commensurately with these market changes
and concerns, but such clarity has yet to come to fruition.
It is certain, however, that the tradition of outright hostility
to firms with monopoly power eroded with Brooke Group and
Matsushita, and was fully shed by the Supreme Court in its 2004
decision of Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP.125 In Trinko, the Court held that the “mere
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important
element of the free-market system.”126 That Court went on to
explain that the “opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least
for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.”127 Indeed, the Court not only refrained from
displaying hostility towards monopolies generally, but, in fact,
condoned them to the extent their benefits incentivize firms to
offer enhanced products and to endeavor to satisfy unmet
consumer needs.128 Trinko, moreover, cautioned that courts
should be wary of erroneously condemning allegedly exclusionary
conduct, noting that “[m]istaken inferences and the resulting
false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the

125

540 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2004).
Id. at 407.
127
Id.
128
In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to recognize this value deriving
from monopoly rewards. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S.
438, 454–55 (2009).
126
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very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’ The cost
of false positives counsels against undue expansion of § 2
liability.”129
The courts have also recognized that analysis of whether
conduct harms the competitive process cannot be based solely on
the defendant’s conduct. The analysis must also include an
inquiry into the complainant’s ability to overcome the challenged
practice through countermeasures of its own. When doing so is
not unduly difficult, the effect of the challenged practice may well
be to enhance competition.130
While these recognitions are insightful and offer some
guidance, we are far from complete cohesion in exclusionary
conduct analysis.
Many seemingly pre-antitrust revolution
claims have survived. For instance, in West Penn Allegheny
Health System v. UPMC,131 the appellate court sustained a claim
that a vertical agreement harmed competition by providing the
defendant with more favorable treatment, causing the plaintiff to
receive less advantageous reimbursement rates,132 and that
purportedly false statements about the plaintiff caused it “to pay
artificially inflated financing costs” on debt held by sophisticated
Wall Street investors.133 Other courts have cited Alcoa as stating
the basic rule for monopolization, appearing even to rely upon
Alcoa’s conception that “no monopolist monopolizes unconscious
of what he is doing.”134
129

540 U.S. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)); see also Linkline, 555 U.S. at 451 (also quoting
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136–37
(1998); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1998); Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 458 (1993) (“[T]his Court and other
courts have been careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill competition,
rather than foster it.”); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (noting that incorrect incorrectly
identifying conduct as predatory pricing is “especially costly because [it] chill[s] the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect”).
130
See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2007).
131
627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
132
Id. at 105. But see Monahan’s Marine v. Bos. Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 527
(1st Cir. 1989).
133
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 110. But see Sanderson v.
Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2005).
134
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Some recent agency cases, such as the FTC’s case against McWane,
Inc., currently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, No. 14-11363, have likewise been
criticized for employing pre-revolution theory and analysis. See Opinion of the
Commission, McWane, Inc., Docket No. 9351 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140206mcwaneopinion_0.pdf;
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The cases today, accordingly, provide no consistent, thorough
approach for evaluating allegedly exclusionary conduct.
Although the beginnings of rules have started to emerge for
specific types of conduct, not even these rules are yet clear, aside
from the below-cost pricing rule for predatory pricing. The
antitrust agencies have been concerned enough with this opaque
state of play to hold hearings in both 2006 and 2014 surrounding
the issue of how antitrust should approach various allegedly
exclusionary behaviors.135 Following the agencies’ 2006 to 2007
hearings, the U.S. Department of Justice issued its “Section 2
Report,”136 which sought “to make progress toward the goal of
developing sound, clear, objective, effective and administrable
standards for Section 2 analysis.”137 While this Report was
intended to clarify the agencies’ approach to section 2, it was
quite controversial—with the Federal Trade Commission
refusing to join—and was withdrawn just a few months after
being issued.138 One important reason for its ultimate revocation
is that, according to many, the Report attempted to over-simplify
section 2 enforcement by fitting most, if not all, allegedly
exclusionary conduct into a variant of the Brooke Group
price-cost framework.139 But exclusionary conduct can manifest

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, McWane, Inc., Docket No.
9351 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/202211/140206mcwanestatement.pdf. Others have vigorously
defended the result. See Steven C. Salop, Economic and Legal Analysis of Exclusive
Dealing by Monopolists: A Decision-Theoretic Approach (forthcoming 2015).
135
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC DOJ Seek Comments for Upcoming
Hearings on Single-Firm Conduct (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2006/03/ftc-doj-seek-comments-upcoming-hearings-single
-firm-conduct; Conditional Pricing Practices: Economic Analysis and Legal Policy
Implications: An FTC-DOJ Workshop (June 23, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/events-calendar/2014/06/conditional-pricing-practices-economic-analysis-legal
-policy.
136
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
137
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Issues Report on
Antitrust Monopoly Law 1–2 (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/press_releases/2008/236975.pdf.
138
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report
on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm.
139
See, e.g., id.; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Commissioners Harbour,
Leibowitz & Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of
Justice (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/

FINAL_JACOBSON

2015]

10/7/2015 7:09 PM

EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN ANTITRUST

123

in many ways that are not properly captured by a price-cost test.
The Report thus left many unsatisfied and ill at ease—and left
open the question of what rule or rules to apply in exclusionary
conduct cases.
With unclear, and at times conflicting, guidance and
opinions seeming to abound, the question then arises of what is
an exclusionary conduct defendant or plaintiff to do?
VI. EMERGENCE OF A FLEXIBLE EQUALLY EFFICIENT RIVAL
APPROACH
It is widely recognized that distinguishing pro and
anticompetitive conduct is a fundamental and significant hurdle
for antitrust factfinders, and, as discussed, exclusionary conduct
has proven to be a particularly thorny arena.140 It is equally well
recognized that efforts to find a one-size-fits-all standard for all
aspects of exclusionary conduct have failed, and that different
types of conduct require their own assessments.141
To assist in the tricky endeavor of identifying the conduct
that crosses the line, antitrust law often seeks to create screens
for ascertaining at an early stage whether particular conduct
poses a serious risk of harming consumers.142 Several factors
must be taken into account in designing any such screen,
including: (1) what economic theory instructs may be the
particular adverse consequences arising the type of conduct in
issue; (2) what empirical evidence suggests regarding how often
the conduct will yield undesirable outcomes; and (3) the capacity
of the fact finder—be it an agency, a judge, or a jury—to
understand and properly distinguish between procompetitive and
anticompetitive conduct. Bearing these considerations in mind, a
useful way to evaluate many forms of allegedly exclusionary
conduct, especially given current economic understanding, is to
determine whether the conduct passes a flexible equally efficient
rival screen. The question posed is whether a hypothetical rival,
facing the same incremental costs as the defendant, can
attachments/press-releases/ftc-commissioners-react-department-justice-report-comp
etition-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under/080908section2stmt.pdf.
140
See supra Part V.
141
See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the
Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 437 (2006).
142
This is exemplified, perhaps most prominently, in the below-cost pricing
requirement for predatory pricing.
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profitably meet or better the defendant’s sales offer; if so, that
offer should not be deemed exclusionary. This screen thus
changes the focus of the analysis from one directed solely at the
conduct of the defendant to one that also considers the real effect
on the plaintiff—to determine whether there is true exclusion or
whether the conduct is better characterized as creating an
incentive for the plaintiff to dig down and compete more
effectively.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that this
equally efficient rival analysis provides an effective safe harbor,
not a test of illegality. Prices or other offers that could not be
met on this basis would not necessarily be unlawful; rather,
further analysis would be required to discern whether the effect
of the conduct would increase, protect, or maintain the
defendant’s market power. But conduct that an efficient rival
could counter effectively would be deemed not exclusionary or
otherwise unlawful. The test should, in other words, rule out the
possibility that exclusion is occurring based upon the competitive
merits. In doing so, the test seeks to ensure that rivals have an
equal opportunity to compete for the business in issue.
Competition at this stage is often a significant driver of consumer
benefits, and preserving competition for the contract is,
accordingly, a high priority in antitrust law.143 The equally
efficient rival approach is designed to balance the desire to avoid
punishing competitively beneficial conduct against the need to
prevent firms from employing facially beneficial practices to
maintain or otherwise exploit their monopoly power.
Simultaneously, as developed below, this test remains relatively
administrable while being nuanced enough to respond to
differing economic considerations in various types of, but not all,
exclusion cases.
The equally efficient rival test, moreover, finds considerable
support in both academia and case law. Prominent antitrust
scholars have endorsed the equally efficient rival test. Judge
Posner, for example, contends that a monopolist’s conduct should
be deemed exclusionary if “the challenged practice is likely in the
143
The seminal case on this point is Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Paddock
Publications v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996). On the economic
origins, see Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968);
Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in General and
with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
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circumstances to exclude from the defendant’s market an equally
or more efficient competitor.”144
Areeda and Hovenkamp
similarly support this approach, arguing that “[a]ctionable
exclusion requires a showing not merely that a particular rival
cannot compete effectively, but that no equally efficient rival
can.”145 Some courts have likewise acknowledged the utility of
the equally efficient rival approach. The Ninth Circuit, for
instance, has adopted a test for bundled discounting cases that
“ensures that the only bundled discounts condemned as
exclusionary are those that would exclude an equally efficient
producer of the competitive product or products.”146
The
European Commission has also endorsed this test, noting that
“the Commission will normally only intervene where the conduct
concerned has already been or is capable of hampering
competition from competitors which are considered to be as
efficient as the dominant undertaking.”147
It is unsurprising that the equally efficient rival test has
experienced a certain level of success. In recent years, antitrust
law has shifted to focus much more heavily upon the competitive
effects of allegedly anticompetitive conduct, as opposed to
indirect methods of inferring that certain conduct is or is not
anticompetitive,148 and the equally efficient rival test functionally

144
145

POSNER, supra note 76, at 194–95.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749a (3d ed.

2008).
146
Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883, 909 (9th Cir. 2008);
see also Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The question, therefore, is whether a firm that enjoys a monopoly
on one or more of a group of complementary products, but which faces competition
on others, can price all of its products above average variable cost and yet still drive
an equally efficient competitor out of the market. The answer to this question seems
to be that it can . . . .”); infra Part VII.B (providing a fuller discussion of this case).
But see Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, at 10, In re
Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (FTC File No. 061 0247) (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/08/100804intelanal_0.pdf
(the Commission expressly noted the proposed consent did “not reflect an
endorsement or adoption” of an equally efficient rival test like that espoused in
Peacehealth).
147
Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings February 2009, art. 2, 2009 O.J.
(C 45) 7, 11, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN [hereinafter EC Guidance Paper].
148
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
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hones in on what the excluded rival can and should do to
compete. It is advantageous in that it is not an exclusively
price-cost based, or “Brooke Group,” approach; such approaches
often distract from the actual competitive effects analysis by
focusing, somewhat myopically, upon whether the conduct entails
lost profits that are likely later to be recouped—a focus inapt for
the many varieties of conduct that are both immediately
profitable and exclusionary.149 That is, price-cost based tests are
more adept at analyzing conduct that involves a short-term
sacrifice of profitability with an expectation that the profits will
be recovered once rival competition has been removed. They are
much less appropriate in evaluating methods of exclusion that
rely on methods of foreclosure that are also profitable in the
short term.
The equally efficient rival approach has a fundamentally
closer nexus with the RRC framework. This approach asks
whether, notwithstanding the defendant’s conduct, rivals of
equal efficiency could implement counterstrategies allowing them
profitably to compete for the business; that is, whether by doing
so rivals could achieve minimum efficient scale, which is the
concern inherent in the RRC framework.150 If such competition
would not be profitable, the focus then shifts to discerning why it
is not. At this stage, this approach allows the fact finder to
examine whether it is the defendant’s superior efficiency or
something else—possibly something malevolent151—that, in
practice, renders competition infeasible. Antitrust law endeavors
to proscribe conduct by a monopolist that prevents competitors
from disciplining its monopoly power, and the equally efficient
rival test seeks to ascertain whether such prevention is in fact
occurring by identifying in the first instance where it can be said
that is clearly not. In doing so, the test acknowledges and
attempts to account for the types of harms RRC theories proffer.

files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (“The measurement of market
shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it
illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects.”).
149
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” Makes
No Sense for Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 780–81 (2006).
150
See Joanna Warren, LePage’s v. 3M: An Antitrust Analysis of Loyalty
Rebates, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1605, 1622 (2004).
151
See Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 1975)
(“The term [‘predatory’] probably does not have a well-defined meaning in the
context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister connotation.”).
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While the equally efficient rival test offers numerous
benefits, it is far from perfect. Less efficient rivals can often
compete and generate lower prices or higher output for
consumers.152 By injecting even a modicum of more competition
into the market, less efficient competitors may be able to make
consumers somewhat better off.153 Against this potential benefit,
however, the cost to businesses of increased antitrust exposure
and uncertainty must be weighed.
Is the plaintiff really
constrained from competing, or is its failure just a product of its
less efficient cost structure or, worse, a desire to maintain high
profit margins? Businesses need some standard by which to
judge what they can and cannot do. Without any concrete
standard, antitrust can pose unwarranted risks of chilling
significant amounts of procompetitive conduct. Businesses are
likely to stay far afield from conduct that puts them at risk for
treble damages and follow-on lawsuits, refusing to engage even
in procompetitive conduct that might put it at risk, and the
potential increase in competition deriving from the continued
existence of a less efficient rival may very well be overwhelmed
by the diminished competition along other dimensions.
Especially when the allegedly harmful conduct involves
discounting or implicates a firm’s ability to compete for all or
part of a contract, antitrust law must tread carefully. A blunt
approach in these areas threatens to dampen competition in the
long run and to raise prices to consumers even more than the
supposedly anticompetitive conduct.
At the same time, flexibility and common sense are
necessary.154 Analysis of the rival’s effectiveness need not be
based upon pure price-cost determinations but, rather, should be
flexible enough to conform to the facts of the case at hand.
Where a new entrant, for example, may not be equally efficient
today but is likely to become as efficient in the reasonably
foreseeable future, exclusion of the entrant is likely to harm

152
EC Guidance Paper, supra note 147, ¶ 24; Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary
Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 328 (2006).
153
See Jennifer E. Sturiale, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property as
Merger Remedy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 72 LA. L. REV. 605, 610 (2012).
154
This flexibility extends both to the initial, screening application of the
equally efficient rival approach, and to subsequent conduct-specific analysis under
the full rule of reason for those cases that fail the first screen.
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consumers.155 The focus on the entrant’s ability to compete,
therefore, should be forward-looking and take into consideration
the entrant’s likely efficiency, in the absence of exclusion, over
the next few years.156 Similarly, where costs are relevant, the
analysis needs to account for those types of products, such as
drugs or software, where incremental costs are very low but
where upfront investments may be quite high; this disparity in
cost allocation could theoretically allow a firm to price above
incremental cost but well below the cost at which an equally
efficient rival could effectively compete, due, for instance, to the
rival’s more recent entry and need to cover a greater portion of
its upfront costs in its sales price.
This flexibility, while essential to protect the competitive
process, necessarily injects some additional uncertainty into the
analysis. Still, application of this kind of flexible equally efficient
rival analysis should allow firms to plan and compete effectively.
The ultimate focus is whether the rival could, if it elected to
compete effectively, take steps to gain the business—or sufficient
business—in issue. If the rival can cut its prices or otherwise
defeat the threatened foreclosure, the conduct should not be
unlawful. If it cannot do so because of an inefficient cost
structure or other factors for which the defendant is not
responsible, it similarly should have no claim. But if the practice
in question would prevent an equally efficient rival from
competing effectively to constrain the defendant’s market, and is
not offset by sufficient consumer benefits, the rival’s case should
be allowed to proceed. Dominant firms and their counsel should
be able to analyze these factors well enough to separate the safe
from the unduly dangerous.157 The essence of the antitrust point
155
See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 269; Thomas A. Piraino, An
Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 32–33 (1999).
156
See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are
Not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Marked Power, 112
YALE L.J. 681, 755 (2003).
157
Justice Brandeis’s famous observation is apt:
I have been asked many times as regard to particular practices or
agreements as to whether they were legal or illegal under the Sherman
[antitrust] law. One gentleman said to me: ‘We do not know where we can
go.’ To which I replied: ‘I think your lawyers . . . can tell you where a fairly
safe course lies. If you are walking along a precipice no human being can
tell you how near you can go to that precipice without falling over, because
you may stumble on a loose stone, . . . but [the lawyer] can tell you where

FINAL_JACOBSON

2015]

10/7/2015 7:09 PM

EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN ANTITRUST

129

is that a plaintiff who can compete should—and a plaintiff that
cannot compete effectively due to its own inefficiency, or
unwillingness, should not be able to advance a cognizable
claim.158
VII. APPLICATION IN PRACTICE
This analysis can be applied to many variants of allegedly
exclusionary conduct, including exclusive dealing, bundling,
loyalty discounts, and tying: but it is not a panacea. The types of
practices with exclusionary potential are many and varied, with
different effects and with widely varying implications for
dominant firm incentives. Efforts to develop an overall test for
dominant firm conduct have therefore proven elusive.159 We set
forth here some of the variants of dominant firm conduct that are
often challenged to see where—and how—equally efficient rival
analysis can be applied, and where it cannot.
A.

Exclusive Dealing

The equally efficient rival test proves especially beneficial in
instances such as exclusive dealing where the allegedly
exclusionary conduct only rarely raises legitimate competitive
concerns, but where, when present, such concerns can be quite
serious.160 It is well-recognized that numerous procompetitive
benefits are associated with most exclusive arrangements—these
arrangements often make distribution more effective by
increasing dedication and loyalty, minimizing free-riding,
improving product quality, and providing customers and
you can walk perfectly safe within convenient distance of that precipice.’
The difficulty which men have felt . . . has been rather that they wanted to
go to the limit rather than that they have wanted to go safely.
Hearings on S. Res. No. 98 Before the Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong.
1161 (1911).
158
Courts have, indeed, recognized this very point. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v.
Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that unlawful foreclosure
may occur when competitors are “driven out . . . because they are never given an
opportunity to compete, despite their ability to offer products with significant
customer demand”); Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP,
592 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding competitors were not foreclosed “because
‘a competing manufacturer need[ed] only offer a better product or a . . . better deal to
acquire [a customer’s business]’ ”).
159
See Popofsky, supra note 141, at 435–36.
160
See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir.
2005).
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suppliers with a reliable supply source.161
Under certain
circumstances, however, exclusivity can lock a plaintiff out and
raise rivals costs in a manner that enhances the defendant’s
market power, without commensurate consumer benefits.
Distinguishing between these two scenarios is critical, and the
flexible equally efficient rival test provides a workable
mechanism for doing so.
The screen we would suggest is relatively clear for exclusive
dealing: A plaintiff who can either break the exclusivity with an
equally attractive offer of its own or otherwise effectively compete
for sufficient business such that it continues to constrain the
defendant’s market power should not be allowed to recover. This
screen recognizes that most exclusive dealing cases today are
based upon RRC theories, which posit that a defendant may be
anti-competitively excluding a rival using non-price foreclosure
mechanisms.162 Indeed, substantial foreclosure is a necessary
condition in any exclusive dealing case: The plaintiff must
demonstrate that it was blocked or impeded from either sufficient
volume or a critical input so as to prevent it from meeting
minimum efficient scale or otherwise competing effectively, and
that this impairment of rivals contributed materially to the
defendant’s acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.
A focus solely upon the percentage of the market covered by
the arrangements, however, is inappropriate. This is especially
true given the ease with which market definitions and
foreclosure percentages can be manipulated. Reliance simply on
numbers often obscures an analysis of actual competitive effects
in favor of a more formalistic reliance upon the percentage of
contracts covered by the exclusionary agreements alone, often
without any accounting for the competitive realities surrounding
161
See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying
Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183
(Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010); Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,”
and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 357–60 (2002); Joshua D. Wright,
Commissioner, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Made at the Bates White 10th
Annual Antitrust Conference, Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurate?
The Case for an Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating Loyalty Discounts
(June 3, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/simple-wrong-or-complex-more-accurate-case-exclusive-dealingbased-approach-evaluating-loyalty/130603bateswhite.pdf.
162
Indeed, as discussed, a defendant may be pricing above cost but still
excluding a competitor to the detriment of competition and consumers. See
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 243.
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the agreements, such as what percentage of the volume the
defendant would have supplied even absent the exclusive
component.163
Instead of looking solely to numeric percentages, the focus
ought to be upon whether, in fact, the arrangement is such that
an efficient rival is so impaired that it can no longer compete
effectively. If, for instance, an efficient competitor could offer the
same or a better deal than the defendant without enticing any
customers away because of the defendant’s arrangements, the
likelihood the defendant is behaving in an exclusionary fashion is
higher.
Courts have recognized and applied this reasoning in two
notable recent cases, NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co.164 and Eisai Inc. v.
Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC.165 In NicSand, the court affirmed a
dismissal of NicSand’s exclusive dealing claims after concluding
NicSand’s loss of market share to 3M stemmed from its refusal to
engage in the vigorous competition required to satisfy consumers’
expectations.166 Between 1987 and 2001, NicSand and 3M were
the only nationwide suppliers of do-it-yourself automotive
sandpaper, a market in which six large retail purchasers
accounted for eighty percent of the market and in which five of
these retailers offered their shelf space on an exclusive basis for
one year at a time.167 At its peak, NicSand commanded a sixtyseven percent market share, but rapidly lost standing to 3M
between 1997 and 2001.
After experiencing this loss of prominence, NicSand brought
an antitrust suit against 3M. NicSand premised its claims upon
three of 3M’s competitive strategies: (1) The up-front payments
that 3M offered to the four retailers that switched from NicSand
163
If, for example, a defendant’s exclusive agreements cover eighty percent of a
market, but it would have supplied seventy-five percent even if it did not offer an
exclusive arrangement, then the effect of the exclusive component is to prevent
rivals from accessing that additional five percent of the market; courts, however,
would typically calculate the percentage foreclosure in this example as eighty
percent without further inquiry. See Wright, supra note 109, at 1182–83, 1185
(analyzing cases in which courts have misused the “substantial foreclosure” screen
and proffering a “but-for foreclosure” measurement that accounts for the volume a
defendant would have absent any exclusive arrangement and would more accurately
reflect the competitive effects of exclusive agreements at issue).
164
507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007).
165
No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL 1343254 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014).
166
507 F.3d at 447.
167
Id.
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to 3M; (2) the multi-year terms of the agreements between 3M
and the retailers; and (3) the exclusive nature of these
agreements.168 The court found each of these grounds meritless.
First, the court noted that, even accounting for the up-front
payments, NicSand conceded that 3M did not engage in any
predatory pricing, and, moreover, that retailers routinely
demanded such payments before switching suppliers. Second,
the court found 3M merely offered—but did not require—multiyear contracts, and that the retailers were able to insist upon
lower prices in exchange for these longer contracts. Indeed, the
court observed that “[h]aving previously paid NicSand prices
generating 38-49% profits margins, the large retailers cannot be
blamed for accepting better prices with 3M for several years, not
just one.”169
Finally, turning to the exclusive nature of the agreements at
issue, the court held “NicSand has not claimed—and cannot
tenably claim—that it suffered . . . anticompetitive effects”
deriving from the exclusive contracts.170 The court noted, again,
that the exclusive nature of the agreements was something the
retailers insisted upon, not something 3M forced upon them. The
court continued to find that “NicSand offer[ed] no explanation
why it could not compete for these multi-year agreements nor
why (in view of its high margins) it could not match 3M’s
discounts.”171 Quite to the contrary, the court found “NicSand
had every opportunity to compete and yet it failed to do so.”172
Accordingly, the court dismissed NicSand’s claims.
Similarly, in Eisai, the court held Eisai’s antitrust claims
could not withstand an exclusive-dealing analysis because the
court believed there was no evidence Eisai was precluded from
competing for the contracts.173
Both Eisai and Sanofi
manufactured competing anticoagulant drug products, Fragmin
and Lovenox, respectively.174 Eisai contended Sanofi’s loyalty

168

Id. at 451.
Id. at 453.
170
Id. at 454.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL
1343254, at *31 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014). As a disclaimer, Mr. Jacobson represented
Eisai at the motion to dismiss stage of proceedings in this case. Nothing in this
paper should be taken as representing the views of Eisai or any party to the case.
174
Id. at *1.
169
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discounts program constituted unlawful exclusionary conduct
under an exclusive dealing theory because it was foreclosed from
sixty-eight percent to eighty-four percent of the market and
because “more hospitals would have switched to Fragmin . . . if
not for the Lovenox Program[.]”175 The court, however, concluded
on summary judgment that no unlawful foreclosure occurred,
noting that record evidence indicated “Eisai could, and at times
did, compete more vigorously to increase its market share,” and
that, when Eisai did “compete[] more aggressively by offering
greater discounts, it won more business.”176 Indeed, the court
found both Fragmin’s and another competitor’s drugs gained
market share during the period of allegedly anticompetitive
conduct, thereby indicating “that customers could walk away
from the Lovenox discounts when they so desired, and they
did.”177 Here again, the court focused upon whether the plaintiff
could compete, and its holding hinged upon the finding that Eisai
could do, and at times did do, just that.
NicSand and Eisai provide examples of how the flexible
equally efficient rival test can operate in practice. In each case,
the court inquired whether the plaintiff was capable of competing
for the contracts, analyzing the allegations and the facts to
determine, fundamentally, what was being argued and what was
actually occurring. The courts determined that, in each instance,
the plaintiff proffered no reason why it could not have competed
successfully for the contracts in the first instance. The courts

175

Id. at *32.
Id. at *33–34.
177
Id. at *34. Moreover, the court then noted its holding was consistent with the
approach taken in other circuits under similar facts. It cited the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592
F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that competitors are not foreclosed
when “a competing manufacturer need[] only offer a better product or a . . . better
deal to acquire [a customer’s business]”; the Eighth Circuit’s Concord Boat Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000), opinion, finding
competitors are not unlawfully excluded when customers are “ ‘free to walk away’
from the discounts and [they] d[o] in fact walk away when competitors offer[] better
discounts”; and the Sixth Circuit’s NicSand opinion and concluded these cases
demonstrate “that, in general, antitrust claims fail if customers are able to walk
away from the defendant’s discounts and still use the defendant as a supplier.”
Eisai, 2014 WL 1343254, at *34–36.
176
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concluded that NicSand and Eisai were both capable of offering
more competitive terms but had opted not to and should not be
rewarded for refusing to engage in competitive behavior.178
B.

Bundling

Bundling presents a somewhat easier, at least in principle,
application of the equally efficient rival test. Bundling occurs
when a discount is conditioned on the buyer’s agreement to
purchase two or more products from the same seller and is
pervasive in the modern economy. While it is often a means of
price competition with the corresponding consumer benefits,
under a RRC theory, bundling can deprive equally or more
efficient single-product rivals of the volume needed to achieve
economies of scale. In such circumstances, rivals’ ability to
constrain the multi-product defendant’s market power may be
impaired and consumers may be harmed both by the potential
reduction of competition in the competitive product market and
by the reinforcement of barriers to entry in the monopoly product
market.
Courts and scholars have made substantial strides in
applying the equally efficient rival test to bundled discounting.179
Much of this progress followed the heavily criticized opinion in
LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M,180 which itself referenced the equally
efficient rival test, but proceeded, misguidedly, to focus primarily
upon harm to competitors rather than harm to consumers.181 The
LePage’s court held a jury can reasonably conclude that a multiproduct firm with monopoly power in a relevant product market

178
Other cases have similarly concluded exclusive arrangements were not
anticompetitive when the plaintiff had the opportunity and ability to compete for
volume. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d
362, 391 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (“Because Retail Leaders agreements are terminable at
will with thirty days’ notice, retail product and display space are subject to
uninterrupted competitive bidding, and Plaintiffs are not substantially foreclosed
from the relevant market.”), aff’d, 67 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Joshua D.
Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 169
(2006).
179
See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903–04
(9th Cir. 2008); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 145, ¶ 749a; POSNER, supra note
76, at 236; ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.
180
324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
181
Id. at 161.
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violates the antitrust laws when it bundles that product with
another, competitive product in order to expand its share of the
competitive product market.182 This holding essentially premised
liability upon the plaintiff’s inability to offer as comprehensive a
product set, and not upon the ultimate consumer welfare effect
and effectively offered no actual test or any limiting principle.183
The subsequent discussion and critiques identified the
analytical shortcomings of LePage’s and led to important steps
forward, as exemplified in the recommendations of the Antitrust
Modernization Commission184 (“AMC”) and in Cascade Health
Solutions v. Peacehealth.185 The AMC proffered a three-factored
test for assessing bundled discounts: (1) After allocating all
discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of
products to the competitive product, the defendant sold the
competitive product below its incremental cost for the
competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these
short-term losses, either simultaneously or later on; and (3) the
bundled discount has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on
competition.186 This test represents an application of the equally
efficient rival approach to bundling—it is a screen designed to
dispose of those instances in which unlawful exclusionary
conduct is not occurring by asking whether a rival of equal
efficiency could offer the product at the same price. Only a less
efficient rival would be negatively impacted by the multi-product
firm’s bundling if the price of the product remained above cost
even after attributing all discounts to that product. And only if a
bundle fails this test would the case proceed to analyzing the
competitive effects of the bundle.
The Ninth Circuit in PeaceHealth employed a similar
approach when presented with a bundled discount case. The
plaintiff in PeaceHealth, McKenzie, offered only primary and
secondary hospital care, while the defendant, PeaceHealth,
offered primary, secondary, and tertiary care.
McKenzie
contended PeaceHealth engaged in unlawful bundling by offering
insurers additional discounts of up to thirty-five to forty percent

182

Id. at 161–62.
See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exploring the Antitrust Modernization
Commission’s Proposed Test for Bundled Pricing, 21 ANTITRUST 23, 24 (2007).
184
AMC REPORT, supra note 179.
185
515 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2008).
186
Id. at 900.
183
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if the insurer made PeaceHealth its only preferred provider for
all three levels of care. In analyzing these allegations, the Ninth
Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s LePage’s approach,
given “the endemic nature of bundled discounts in many spheres
of normal economic activity.”187 Likewise, it declined to apply a
full Brooke Group analysis, which would apply an “aggregate
discount” rule and find the bundle unlawful only if the
discounted price of the entire bundle were below the bundling
firm’s incremental cost of producing the entire bundle.188 In
doing so, the court recognized:
[B]undled discounts present one potential threat to consumer
welfare that single product discounts do not: A competitor who
produces fewer products than the defendant but produces the
competitive product at or below the defendant’s cost to produce
that product may nevertheless be excluded from the market
because the competitor cannot match the discount the
defendant offers over its numerous product lines.189

Instead, the court held a test based upon the equally efficient
rival approach was appropriate:
[A] plaintiff who challenges a package discount as
anticompetitive must prove that, when the full amount of the
discounts given by the defendant is allocated to the competitive
product or products, the resulting price of the competitive
product or products is below the defendant’s incremental cost to
produce them. This requirement ensures that the only bundled
discounts condemned as exclusionary are those that would
exclude an equally efficient producer of the competitive product
or products.190

Accordingly, case law and commentary have demonstrated
that an equally efficient rival approach to bundling is both
analytically sound, given current economics, and an effective
screen in practice. Moreover, this approach strikes a nice
balance between the unacceptably vague and overbroad LePage’s
test and the unacceptably narrow full Brooke Group variant of
per se legality.

187
188
189
190

Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 909.
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Loyalty Discounts

Application of the equally efficient rival test to loyalty
discounts, on the other hand, is rather more complex. Loyalty
discounts reward consumers for purchasing more from the same
supplier; such discounts come in different forms: For example, if
a consumer purchases a certain minimum amount of product, he
may be rewarded by paying a lower price for each unit going
forward or the discount might “revert back” to the first units
purchased and the consumer given a “rebate” on those units.191
For loyalty discounts, then, attributing all the relevant
discounts to the “competitive product” is not literally possible, as
the discounts all apply to the same product. Theoretically, the
attribution test can be adapted by separating the contestable
from the incontestable volumes. While separating these volumes
is theoretically possible, and can be modeled nicely when all the
simplifying assumptions are made, this exercise is completely
impractical and generally unusable in the real world.192 In Eisai,
for instance, Eisai’s expert argued that Sanofi’s loyalty discounts
“bundled contestable and incontestable demand for Lovenox.”193
The expert attempted to put numbers to this theory, but, the
court determined, the contestable and incontestable volumes did
not divide cleanly because the drugs at issue had differing,
sometimes unique, FDA-approved indications, and “the
incontestable demand relating to these unique indications [wa]s
attributable to the inherent properties of the product at issue,
and thus competition on the merits.”194
Rather than becoming entangled in this kind of messy
endeavor, loyalty discounts should be properly analyzed like
exclusive dealing arrangements; after all, the purpose of loyalty

191
See Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust
Law in the United States 1 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 40,
2005) (defining loyalty discounts as “a particular form of non-linear pricing in which
the unit price of a good declines when the buyer’s purchases meet a buyer-specific
minimum threshold requirement”).
192
Greg Werden pointed out to us that the test may get things backwards.
When the contestable volume is sufficiently low, no material exclusionary effect is
possible—and yet the dominant firm’s discounts will typically fall outside the safe
harbor.
193
Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL
1343254, at *27 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014).
194
Id.
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discounts is to induce a certain level of exclusivity.195 Loyalty
discounts offer many of the same efficiencies as exclusive dealing
arrangements.196 Moreover, modern exclusion theories premised
upon loyalty discounts, like those based on exclusive dealing, are
RRC theories—they hinge upon deprivation of scale and the
notion that raising rivals’ costs may allow a defendant to create
or maintain market power, not on below-cost pricing and
recoupment.197 As with exclusive dealing, rivals and competition
may be harmed by preventing a competitor from accessing
sufficient volume, even if the defendant is pricing above cost.
The equally efficient rival approach, therefore, offers a
framework more closely aligned with the economics of the
proffered exclusionary theory.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the
fundamental issue in each exclusive dealing and loyalty discount
cases is also the same. In both instances, the essential question
is whether the plaintiff is able to compete effectively by offering a
comparable discount of its own. If the answer is no, then we
must ask whether the plaintiff’s inability to do so is attributable
to a higher cost structure—or to simple unwillingness to offer
better terms—in which case its claim should not be permitted.
D. Tying
One of the essential elements in any tying case is that the
defendant somehow coerces the consumer into accepting the tied
product.198 There is an application for the equally efficient rival
test to tying because, if a rival can break the tie, or otherwise
compete effectively for the business, then the defendant’s conduct
cannot properly be understood as barring competition. If instead,

195
See Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, ANTITRUST SOURCE
1 (June 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/Jun10_Jacobson6_24f.authcheckdam.pdf.
196
See id.; Wright, supra note 161, at 20–22.
197
See Jacobson, supra note 195, at 5 (“In circumstances where loyalty discounts
may be harmful, the problem is not the price level; it is that rivals are denied access
to customer volume. If the effect is to prevent rivals from constraining the
defendant’s market power, consumer harm may result. Application of a predatory
pricing standard does not accomplish the necessary analysis.”).
198
See, e.g., Borschow Hosp. & Med. Supplies v. Cesar Castillo Inc., 96 F.3d 10,
18 (1st Cir. 1996).
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the allegedly unlawful tie is, in fact, a package of products that
consumers value, that is competition on the merits, not
exclusionary behavior.
E.

Refusals To Deal

As discussed, the equally efficient rival approach provides a
valuable and reasonably administrable screen for analyzing
many types of exclusionary conduct; it is not, however, a test for
every monopolization claim. Refusals to deal are a good example
of the approach’s limitations. If the defendant controls an asset
necessary to effective competition, no rival could be equally
efficient. Importantly, in a refusal to deal with rivals in the same
market—that is, a purely horizontal refusal to deal—antitrust
properly places a very high value on incentives to develop one’s
own product, and, accordingly, such a refusal should only be
actionable if it makes economic sense solely by virtue of the
exclusion of rivals.199 In other words, the no economic sense or
profit sacrifice test is appropriately applied to cases such as
horizontal refusals to deal and price cutting, where the
underlying activity is, typically, the very essence of competition
and only in the rarest of occasions portends actual competitive
harm.200 Even here, however, some inquiry into the availability
of countermeasures is useful. If the desired asset can be

199
See Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years of
Access Denials, 27 ANTITRUST 50, 54 (2012) (“Although we have questioned
application of that [no economic sense or profit sacrifice test] in other contexts, when
considering activities on which antitrust policy places a particularly high
value—such as price cutting or, here, the ‘long recognized right of [a]
trader . . . freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal’—the test works well.”); Jacobson & Sher, supra note 149, at 783 n.21
(“[S]imilar to pricing, courts should be reluctant to interfere with a party’s decision
not to share with rivals assets that it has developed or lawfully acquired. In this
context, the no economic sense test works well to determine whether consumers will
be harmed—protecting the defendant’s incentives to compete and innovate, while
condemning refusals to deal where the defendant objectively sacrifices profit in the
short term and, in the long term, can recoup that loss after its rivals are
marginalized.”); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section
2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 414 (2006).
200
This is true for purely horizontal refusals to deal but not for vertical refusals
to deal. Vertical refusals to deal, while framed as “refusal to deal” cases, are, in fact,
sufficiently similar to either tying or exclusive dealing, depending upon the specific
facts alleged, and are appropriately analyzed as such.
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developed by the rival without undue difficulty, or obtained
elsewhere on reasonable terms, the plaintiff does not have much
of a claim.
F.

Product Design

The equally efficient rival test, similarly, cannot be applied
to product design challenges. If the plaintiff’s product is an input
requiring use of a product or service of the defendant, and is
impacted by a product design change, analysis of the plaintiff’s
efficiency is necessarily less relevant. This is a difficult area in
which the courts must weigh the very high value the law places
on innovation—and the concomitant desire to avoid judicial
second-guessing—against the possibility that trivial or illusive
design changes may be in fact designed solely to exclude rivals.201
There seems little room for equally efficient rival analysis in this
context.
CONCLUSION
In the cases of an earlier era involving allegations of
exclusionary conduct, the focus was solely on the conduct of the
defendant. More modern analysis properly looks to the effects on
the plaintiff as well. Because the issue is exclusion, and because
the fundamental concern in the RRC paradigm is whether a rival
can achieve minimum efficient scale, some inquiry into whether
the plaintiff can or cannot compete effectively against the tactics
in question is essential. Conduct challenged as exclusionary may
in fact prevent rivals from constraining the market power of a
dominant firm.
But the effects of that conduct, almost
invariably, are ambiguous: Does the conduct prevent rivals from
competing effectively or should it cause rivals to compete more
effectively? Distinguishing between these two effects is essential
because the one threatens consumer harm while the other yields
consumer benefits.
There is no one-size-fits-all test for distinguishing
exclusionary conduct from aggressive but legitimate competition.
But by placing at least some of the focus on whether an efficient

201

Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65–67 (D.C. Cir.
2001), with Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d
991, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2010).
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rival could meet or defeat the tactics in question, important light
is shed on the ultimate question of consumer harm. The law is
moving in that direction, and that trend should continue.

